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NEPA AT 21: OVER THE HILL ALREADY?
INTRODUCTION
President Richard Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) into law on January 1, 1970. At the time, Nixon, Congress, academia,
and the environmental movement all felt that this first federal environmental law
heralded the arrival of a time to "reclaim[ ]... our living environment."2
One of the few who felt that NEPA had severe problems was Theodore J.
Lowi, a professor of government at Cornell University.3 He opined that "[NEPA]
states a whole lot of lofty sentiments... [blut there is no law to be found anywhere
in the act."4 ProfessorLowi's words of warning appearto have been quite prophetic.
Since the Supreme Court decided Strycker' s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen5
in 1980, a number of law review articles have announced NEPA's lessening
importance.6 At an age when it should be reaching full maturity and vitality, NEPA
instead appears quite sickly.
The first part of this Comment will briefly review the somewhat meteoric rise
of NEPA including the increase in public awareness which led to federal action, its
projected effect, and the manner in which the courts seemed to be heading in their
treatment of NEPA. The Comment will then review the decline of NEPA due to
subsequent Supreme Court decisions. Finally, the Comment will consider possible
remedies for the present anemic condition of this first federal environmental statute.
THE RISE OF NEPA
A Growing Awareness
From the time that Europeans first began to explore and colonize the New
World, many have felt that its natural resources were practically limitless and
worthwhile only if subdued and put to traditional use.7 Average citizens had no
reason to believe differently until after World War II when the new interstate
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321-4370c (West 1977 & Supp. 1991)
[hereinafter NEPA].
N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1970, at A12, col. 6.
N. ORLoFF & G. BROOKS, THE NATIONAL ENvuRoNMENTAL Poucy Acr 15 (1980).
4 T. Lowi, THE Pouncs OF DISORDER 179 (1971).
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980).
6 See, e.g., Comment, National Environmental Policy Act: An Ambitious Purpose; A Partial Demise, 15
TULSA L.J. 553 (1980) and Murchison, Does NEPA Matter? -An Analysis of the Historical Development
and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmental Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L. Ray. 557 (1984)
1 T. I onAr & R. BROOKS, GREEN JusTca: THE ENvmoNmaw AND Thm COURT 1 (1987) [
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highway system, recent affluence, and an increase in leisure time combined to open
vast areas of the country to them.' Suddenly the vacationing family could appreciate
firsthand the great expanses and wondrous beauty about which they had previously
only read. Many of these same people became interested in preserving the natural
wonders which they had seen.9
Congressional response to this growing public awareness soon followed. In
1959, the Resources and Conservation Act10 proposed to establish both a "unified
statement of conservation, resource, and environmental policy" and a high-level
council in the executive branch." Similar but less comprehensive bills were also
rejected in the mid-1960s. 12 The push for a conservation policy at the federal level
regained momentum in 1968. Congress issued two reports that summer which again
brought environmental concerns to the forefront of public awareness.13 One of their
primary messages was that mission-oriented federal agencies overstressed the
benefits of development while insufficiently exploring alternatives. 4
The events of the following eighteen months brought environmental and
ecological concerns to the attention of the general American populace. 5 With the
country riding the crest of an economic wave and generally optimistic about the
possibilities of modem science, America seemed ready to correct some of its recent
environmental wrongs.16
What NEPA Was Meant to Accomplish
Throughout the 1960s, many voices cried out for federal action concerning the
4 Id. at 3.
9Id.
10 S. 2549, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
" R. ANDREws, ENvmoNMENTAL Poucy AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGE: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL
ENRvmoNMENTAL. Poucv Acr 7 (1976). This bill seems to have been ten years ahead of its time as these same
two provisions were the main pillars of the final draft of NEPA in 1969. See NEPA §§ 101 and 202.
12 R. ANDREWs, supra note 11, at 7.
"3 Andreen, In Pursuit of NEPA's Promise: The Role of Executive Oversight in the Implementation of
Environmental Policy, 64 IND. L J. 205, 212 (1989). The first of these was the Subcomm. on Science,
Research, and Decv. to the House Comm. on Science and Astronautics, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., Managing the
Environment 1-3 (Comm. Print 1968). It portrayed a society focused solely on economic and technological
advancement. The second was the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., A
National Policy for the Environment: A Special Report (Comm. Print 1968). This study, prepared by
Professor Lynton Caldwell, warned of environmental costs which were a natural side effect of a productive
economy and urged Congress to adopt a national environmental policy.
"
4 See also Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Considerations and Energy Demands: A Comment on Calvert
Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645, 658 (1972).
5 In 1969 alone, the FDA prevented 28,000 pounds of Lake Michigan salmon from going to market because
of excessive pesticide levels; scientific studies reported that phosphate-induced plant growth was choking
the Great Lakes; medical research showed DDT levels of four times greater than that considered "safe for
human consumption" in the breast milk of American mothers; and the Santa Barbara area was affected by
oil spill. T. HOBAN & R. BROOKS supra note 7, at 3-4.
'6 Id. at 60-61.
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environment.17  One of the strongest of these advocates was Professor Lynton
Caldwell, government professor at Indiana University. 8 At a Senate hearing on the
NEPA bill, Professor Caldwell argued in favor of a national environmental policy
which would include an action-forcing, operational aspect.' 9 Professor Caldwell
urged the Senate to adopt a policy which would compel Executive agencies "to take
the kind of action which [would] protect [the environment]." 20 To this end, he
implored the Senate to adopt a policy capable of implementation, "not merely a
statement of things hoped for, not merely a statement of desirable goals or
objectives ... .,,21 Senator Henry Jackson, one of NEPA's major sponsors, agreed
with Professor Caldwell: "[W]hat is needed in restructuring the governmental side
of the problem is to legislatively create... an action-forcing procedure the depart-
ments must comply with. Otherwise, these lofty declarations are nothing more than
that."'22 This interchange caused Senator Jackson to amend S. 1075 (i.e., the bill
which was to eventually become a major portion of NEPA) to include an action-
forcing section. 23 When the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
reported on S. 1075, the Committee noted that Senator Jackson's amendment had
been"designed to assure that all Federal agencies plan and work toward meeting the
challenge of a better environment,"24 and that the amendment helped to "insure that
the policies enunciated in section 101 are implemented." 25
Later in the legislative process,26 explaining the addition of "to the fullest
extent possible" to the language of NEPA § 102,27 the conference committee stated,
' See F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER& A.D. TARLOCK, ENViRoNmENTAL PROmCnoN: LAW AND PoUcY 4-5
(1990); The Environment: A National Mission for the Seventies (Editors of Fortune 1970).
'Professor Caldwell authored a study, Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th Cong., 2dSess.,
A National Policyfor the Environment: A Special Report (Comm. Print 1968), which the committee decided
to print.
'9 National Environmental Policy: Hearing on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the Senate Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1 st Sess. 116 (1969) [hereinafter "Senate Hearings"].
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 This amendment became, with minor revisions, NEPA § 102(A)-(E). R. ANDREWS, supra note 11, at 9.
24 S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969).
Id. at 19.26 A number of distinguished commentators have traced thelegislative history of NEPA. See, e.g., Andreen,
supra note 13, at 212-23; R. AmNRaws, supra note 11, at 7-19; F. ANDERSON, NEPA iN Tim CouMTs: A L
ANALYSiS os THE NATIONAL ENvmoNmENrAL PoLIcY ACr 1-14 (1973); R. LutoFF, A NATIONAL PoucY FOR THE
ENVmoNMENT: NEPA AND ITs AvreRMATH 10-35 (1976); Hanks & Hanks, An Environmental Bill of Rights:
The Citizen Suit and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RuTGERs L REv. 230 (1970).
27 In pertinent part, that section reads
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: ... (2) all agencies
of the Federal Government shall - (A) utilize a systematic... approach ... in... deci-
sionmaking which may havean impact on man's environment; (B) identify and develop...
procedures ... which will insure that... environmental... values may be given appro-
priate consideration.. .; (C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for
legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of
the... environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-(i) the environ-
NEPA AT 21Spring, 19911
3
Burleson: NEPA at 21
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1991
"[T]he purpose of the language is to make clear that each agency ... shall comply
with the directives set out in subparagraphs (A) through (H) unless the existing
law... expressly prohibits or makes full compliance ... impossible. '2 To Sena-
tor Jackson, this meant that "the policies and goals [of NEPA would be] infused into
the ongoing programs... of the Federal Government .... [I1f there are to be
departures from this standard of excellence they should be exceptions to the
rule .... 29
The Early Years of Promise
Initially, the judicial role in implementing NEPA was unclear. Controversy
existed as to whether NEPA's effect on the decisionmaking process of federal
agencies was even subject to judicial review. 0 The federal courts soon proved to be
more than willing to enter this fray.3' Some courts were willing to review only the
procedural aspects of an agency's actions.32 As one of these courts posited, federal
agencies could continue to ignore environmental considerations in their decision-
making processes; however, NEPA assured that "they [would] ... do[ ] so with
their eyes wide open."33
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia took the lead in giving
NEPA some "bite" in Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. United States
Atomic Energy Commission.34 In that case, the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC)35 issued guidelines concerning how NEPA would affect nuclear power plant
licensing procedures.36 These guidelines curtailed AEC's duty when considering
mental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided .... (iii) alternatives...; (E)... describe appropriate alternatives to recom-
mended courses of action ....
NEPA § 102 (emphasis added).
SH.R. CoNF. R.P. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969) (emphasis added).
29 115 Cong. Rec. 40, 416 (1969).
0 An early version of the bill which eventually became NEPA stipulated that every person had a right to a
healthful environment. This would clearly have created a public interest capable of judicial enforcement.
F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. D. TARLOCK, supra note 17, at 784. The final version did not expressly
provide for judicial review. Id. at 782. Some portions of the legislative history even seem to indicate that
the principal means of enforcement was to be the budgetary review process. Senate Hearings, supra note
19, at 116-17. Professor Caldwell appears to have believed that Congress and the Office of Management
and Budget would be the primary enforcers of NEPA. F. ANDERSON, D. MANDELKER & A. D. TARLocK, supra
note 17, at 786.
"An early NEPA decision held that the act contained no law to apply. Bucklein v. Volpe, 2 Env't. Rep. Cas.
(BNA) 1082 (N.D. Cal. 1970). The court felt that NEPA was "simply a declaration of Congressional policy."
Id. at 1083.
32 Courts that did so were likely to find that Congress did not intend NEPA § 101 to create any substantive
duties. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of the United States Army, 325 F.
Supp. 749,755 (E.D. Ark. 1971)(granting injunction), vacated, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972), affd,
470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972).
3 Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of the United States Army, 325 F. Supp. at 759.
Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee v. United States Atomic Energy Commission, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
" That agency eventually became the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
Murchison, supra note 6, at 563.
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environmental impacts in its license issuing procedures.3" In addition to acting as
the final decisionmaker in granting nuclear plants operating licenses, the AEC alone
would decide which data to consider in making those decisions.38 Plaintiffs brought
suit to challenge this arrangement. 39
Judge Skelly Wright, a well known judicial activist,1° announced the decision
of the court. Although Judge Wright appeared less than enthusiastic about the lack
of legislative history of NEPA41 and the lack of specificity within the statute,42 he
emphatically declared that NEPA was "perhaps the most important of the recent
[environmental] statutes .... -43 Amidst these broad declarations, Judge Wright
clarified two very important issues. First, NEPA established judicially enforceable
obligations." This effectively settled the controversy over the judiciary's role in
NEPA enforcement. Second, agencies could not treat NEPA § 102(2)(C) statements
(environmental impact statement, EISs) as nuisances to be attached to a final
report' Judge Wright apparently interpreted the "to the fullest extent possible"
language of NEPA § 102 in accord with Senator Jackson's expressed desire.4
Although Judge Wright recognized that "reviewing courts probably [could not]
reverse a substantive decision on the merits," 47 he warned that the courts would be
forced to reverse agency decisions reached "without individualized consideration
and balancing of environmental factors." Judge Wright interpreted NEPA § 101
as allowing courts to reverse agency decisions on the merits if the "balance of costs
and benefits.., was arbitrary or... gave insufficient weight to environmental
values."'49
By almost assuming that NEPA required a "balancing" between costs and
benefits, Judge Wright seemed to suggest that NEPA imposed substantive respon-
sibilities on the agencies affected by it.50 Although several commentators criticized
31 F. ANDERSON, D. MANDEUCER & A. D. TARLocK, supra note 17, at 786.33 T. HOBAN & R. BROOKS, supra note 7, at 62.
39 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1111-12.
40 Murchison, supra note 6, at 563. For a review of his judicial career, see A. MAiER, A CAPAcrTY FOR
OuTRAEc: ThE JuDIAL ODYSSEY OF J. SKELLY WRIoHT (1984). Judge Wright himself revealed some of the
bases of his judicial philosophy in a law review article published near the time that the Calvert Cliffs
decision was announced. Wright, Professor Bicket, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84
HARv. L. REv. 769 (1971).
41 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1126 (calling it "meager").
42 Id. at 1111. Professor Caldwell even admitted that NEPA was a sweeping, rather than a specific, law, i.e.,
a "statesman's law rather than a lawyer's law." R. ANDREws, supra note 11, at 17 (citing Caldwell, The
National Environmental Policy Act: Status and Accomplishments, in Natural Resources and National
Priorities: Proceedings of the 38th North American Wildlife and Natural Resources Conference (1973)).
43 Id.
4d. at 1112, 1115.
43 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1114-15. See also T. Hoia &R. BROOKS, supra note 7, at 62.
4' See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
47 Calvert Cliffs, 449 F.2d at 1115.
"1d. See also Schiffler v. Schlesinger, 548 F.2d 96, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1977) (judicial review warranted even
where agency's actions under enabling legislation "committed to [its own] discretion.").
49 Id.
50 F. ANDERSON, D. MAN.ELKER & A. D. TARLocK, supra note 17, at 787.
NEPA AT 21Spring, 19911
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the underlying idea,51 this language52 became the basis for holdings in a number of
federal cases.53 One of the most important of these was the Eighth Circuit's decision
in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States
Army.'" As a basis for its belief that an agency's attempted compliance with NEPA
constituted substantive, reviewable action, the court stated, "The... intent of
NEPA is to require agencies to... give effect to the environmental goals set forth
in the Act, not just to file detailed impact studies .... "56 The court felt that it could
substitute its own judgment for that of the agency's on whether NEPA required a
cost-benefit analysis and whether the benefits of a particular project had to outweigh
its costs for that project to even have a chance to proceed past the proposal stage.57
Although the court refused to substitute its judgment as to the weight to be accorded
environmental values,58 it did feel that the policies set forth in NEPA § 101 formed
a basis for reviewing an agency's "weight setting" procedure under an"arbitrary and
capricious" standard.5 9 This interpretation of NEPA's substance has become the
most prevalent one. 60
Another subject of early NEPA litigation was the effect of the words "major"
and "significantly" in NEPA § 102(2)(C) on the decision of whether to prepare an
EIS at all.6 The first case to define the standard of review for this type of decision
was Hanly v. Kleindienst.62 Although the language of NEPA § 102(2)(C) 63 would
seem to suggest dual tests (i.e., one for size and anotherfor importance)," Hanly held
that "major" makes size merely a large consideration in the truly important test of
"significance." 65 The court went on to adopt the "arbitrary and capricious" standard
51 See, e.g., ANraasoN, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENviRoNmENTAL LAw 301-02
(1974); Muskie & Cutler,A National EnvironmentalPolicy: Now You See It, Now You Don't, 25 ME. L. REv.
163, 188-89 (1973) [hereinafter "Muskie"].
5 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.53 For a listing of cases following this balancing approach, see W. RODGERS, IJANDBOOK ON ENvioNmEirAL
LAw 746 n. 55 (1977).
470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). See also supra note 32.
sId. at 298 ("[Clourts have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits.").
56 Id.
57 Id. at 300-01. See also Weinstein, Substantive Review Under NEPA After Vermont Yankee IV, 36
SYIcusE L. Rav. 837, 846-47 (1985).
" Id. at 300.
59 Id. at 300-01.
'0 Weinstein, supra note 57, at 847 n. 71.
61 Murchison, supra note 6, at 566. See also F. ANDERSON, D. MANDEL CR & A. D. T4 AR.oc, supra note 17,
at 789-802.
-2 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973).
6 In pertinent part, the statute reads
[A]I agencies of the federal government shall-.. . (C) include in every recommendation
or report on proposals for legislation and othermajor Federal action significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action ....
NEPA § 102(2) (emphasis added).
"Comment, Shall We Be Arbitrary or Reasonable: Standards of ReviewforAgency Threshold Determina-
tions Under NEPA, 19 AKRON L. Rv. 685, 687 (1986).
"Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d at 830-31.
[Vol. 24:3 & 4AKRON LAW REVIEW
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as the appropriate measure of judicial review in this type of case.66 Although the
court gave deference to the agency's decision, it did require the agency to compile
a record which adequately documented its decisionmaking process.67 In other
words, the court was concerned that the agency's decision not be an arbitrary one.
Even when an agency might merely believe that a proposal could have a significant
impact on the environment, Hanly required that agency to prepare an EIS."
After a few years of working with NEPA and seeing how the courts were
handling it, many of those involved seemed to think that it would become, if it were
not already, a "force" in the day-to-day workings of the federal governmenL69 One
of NEPA's most outspoken supporters was the director of the Environmental Law
Institute, Frederick Anderson. He considered the courts' early treatment of NEPA
as the basis for a hope, but not a promise, that the government's manner of
considering the environment in the making of administrative decision was undergo-
ing a positive change. 0 In 1974, he declared that progress in the bureaucratic
decisionmaking process, which had traditionally neglected environmental values
and/or costs, had been made. 71 At the same time, he warned that a "fundamental
administrative revolution," for which he believed NEPA called, had yet to occur.72
Anderson's enthusiasm was at least matched by Professor William Rodgers of
Georgetown University. Rodgers felt that the effect of judicial review of agency
action with respect to NEPA would be somewhat revolutionary. 73 Other commen-
tators, however, were far less enthusiastic.74 One of the most outspoken was Joseph
Sax.15 He concluded that NEPA was nothing more than legislative fluff 6 and that
hopes for agency-initiated self-reform were no more than pipe dreams.
77
Perhaps if the courts had continued to treat NEPA as they did in the early
1970s, the pronouncements of Anderson and Rodgers would have been more
prophetic. Nevertheless, subsequent Supreme Court decisions gutted much of the
substance which the Circuit courts had given NEPA.78 These cases and other
succeeding events have instead vested Professor Sax's naysaying with an accuracy
rivaling that of an atomic clock.
6Id. at 829.
67 Id. at 835-36.
68Id.
69 See, e.g., R. ANDREws, supra note 11, at 143-63.
70 See F. ANDERSON, supra note 26, at vii-ix.
71 AimEasoN, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDEa.A. ENvmoNmrAL LAw 410 (Dolgin &
Guilbert eds. 1974).
52Id.
7 W. RODGERS, supra note 53, at 697.
74 See, e.g., supra note 4 and accompanying text.
73 Sax, a professor at the University of Michigan, was one of the architects of Michigan's environmental
protection statute. Murchison, supra note 6, at 588 n. 175.7' Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239, 245 (1973).
"Id.
78 See infra note 79-155 and accompanying text. 7
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NEPA's DECLINING EFFEcr
Saying that one act of Congress orone Supreme Cour decision drained NEPA
of most of its "life" would be too simplistic. A combination of events, including a
decline in the public's willingness to sacrifice financially due to the OPEC embargo
and the resultant rise in energy prices, which made "sacrifices" for the environment
more costly, over a number of years gradually reduced the effectiveness of NEPA.
Although no single Supreme Court decision caused NEPA's demise, a series
of unconnected, unrelated decisions contributed to its lessening impact. Rather than
some sort of nefarious master plan to undermine a laudable federal policy, the
individual decisions are quite logical, with seemingly minor impacts on NEPA's
overall effectiveness. Yet, when taken together, their effect has been devastating.
NEPA now appears to be no more than the "paper tiger" which Professor Rodgers
feared it might become.
79
Strict Judicial Scrutiny Abandoned
Although not directly dealing with or even addressing NEPA, the Supreme
Court severely restricted judicial (environmental) "activism" in Chevron, U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc."° Respondent NRDC challenged
the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) interpretation of the 1977 Amend-
ments to the Clean Air Act through which the EPA allowed the states to adopt a
plantwide definition of the term "stationary source." 81 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit set aside the EPA regulations based on this interpreta-
tion. 2 The Court set forth the manner in which courts should review an agency's
interpretation of a statute. 3 If Congress had not spoken directly on the issue in
question, the agency's interpretation need only be a reasonable one. 4 The Court
thereby effectively reprimanded the District of Columbia Circuit Court for substi-
tuting its view of the legislation's purpose for that of the EPA.85
One of the major effects of Chevron was to curtail judicial activism. 6 Federal
courts were no longer free to substitute their interpretations of particular statutes for
"' W. RODGERS, supra note 53, at 697.
80 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
SI Id. at 840-41 (NRDC argued that each point of pollution emission should constitute a stationary source).
The EPA's interpretation is set forth at 40 C.F.R. § 51.186) (1) (i) and (ii) (1983).
2 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718 (1982).
8' Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 842-43.
"' Id.
25 Id. at 845.
"' The relative benefits and drawbacks of judicial activism are the subject of continued debate. Compare
Pierce, Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review ofAgency Interpretation of Its Statutory Provisions 41
VAD. L. REv. 301 (1988) with Shapiro & Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch: Separation of
Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DuKE L. J. 387 (1987).
[Vol. 24:3 & 4AKRON LAW REVIEW
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that of the agencies.17 Thus, the courts were less able to intimately scrutinize agency
compliance with NEPA's mandates. In fact, one wonders whether Overton Park, a
large municipal park in the center of Memphis, Tennessee, would have survived
under this tighter standard of review of agency interpretation. The case deciding the
fate of that park"8 precluded judicial review in only two, very narrow circum-
stances.8 9 Justice Marshall went on to state that a reviewing court was to "engage
in a substantial inquiry." 90 This language became the basis for the "hard look"
doctrine91 which thereafter often appeared in environmental decisions. 92 In fact,
Judges Wright and Leventhal of the District of Columbia Circuit Court used this
doctrine in reviewing the EPA Administrator's decision to restrict the use of lead in
gasoline.93
Although not directly affecting NEPA, Chevron did represent a fairly clear
notice by the Supreme Court to the federal courts that they should abandon the "hard
look" doctrine when reviewing an agency's interpretation of complex statutes.9 The
decision thus intimated that the Court would henceforth frown on similar judicial
activism.
No EIS Necessary for Appropriation Requests
In Andrus v. Sierra Club,95 a unanimous Court reversed the District of
Columbia Circuit Court. The latter had required an agency to attach an EIS to an
appropriation request in two situations. When the request accompanied "a 'pro-
posal' for taking new action which significantly changed the status quo" or when
"the request for.. . appropriations is one that ushers in a considered programmatic
course following a programmatic review," the agency had to include an EIS.96 The
"T In other words, the Supreme Court condemned hard look review of agency interpretation of certain
statutes (e.g., enabling statutes). Hard look review with regard to matters other than statutory interpreta-
tion has survived. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (saying a reviewing court should look for a "rational connection between
the facts found and the choice made."). Nevertheless, an agency need only artfully explain why it has
chosen a particular path in any given situation.
" Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
89 One of these was specific, statutory preclusion. Id. at 410. The other was where agency action was
"committed to [the] agency's discretion by law." Id.
90 Id. at 415.
9 Judge Harold Leventhal of the District of Columbia Circuit Court appears to have coined this term. See
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. Federal Communication Comm'n, 444 F.2d 841,850 (D.C. Circ. 1970),
cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) ([C]ourt[s] ... [should] intervene... [when they] become[ ] aware...
that the agency has not really taken a hard look .. ").
9F. ANDERsoN, D. MADELKER & A. D. TAiLocK, supra note 17, at 123.
9 Ethyl Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976)(en banc), cert denied, 426
U.S. 941 (1977). For Judge Wright's comments, see id. at 13-18, 34-36; for Judge Leventhal's comments,
see id. at 68-69.
" See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. at 865-66; F. ANDERsoN,
D. MANDLaKER & A. D. TARLoCK, supra note 17, at 128. See also supra note 87.
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347 (1979).
Sierra Club v. Andrus, 581 F.2d 895, 903 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev'd, 442 U.S. 347 (1979). 9
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Circuit Court held that, while a rule requiring that an EIS be prepared "for virtually
every ongoing program would trivialize NEPA,"97 agencies would have to prepare
an EIS in these two specific situations.98 The Circuit Court reasoned that such
appropriation requests were both "proposals for legislation" and "proposals for...
major Federal actions" because of their tremendous effect on the programs which
they fund.99
The Supreme Court, however, focused its attention on the language of NEPA
§ 102(2)(C) 100 and concluded that appropriation requests were not "proposals for
legislation" under that section of the statute. 01 In doing so, the Court gave great
deference to the Council on Environmental Quality's (CEQ) interpretation of NEPA
§ 102(2)(C).102 That interpretation specifically excluded "requests for appropria-
tions" from "recommendations for legislation."1 03 The Court also noted that
Congress traditionally has drawn a distinction between legislation and requests for
appropriation. °4 Thus, the Court rejected the Circuit Court's first justification, i.e.,
that appropriation requests were proposals for legislation.105 The Court would not
even require agencies to prepare an EIS in the special situations mentioned by the
Court of Appeals."° The Court also rejected the justification that appropriation
requests amounted to proposals for major federal action." The Court noted that
appropriation requests fund previously-proposed actions rather than propose new
ones."18
At first glance, one might think that the Supreme Court's conclusions that"an
additional EIS at the appropriation stage would add nothing"'8 9 and that such a
requirement would "create unnecessary redundancy"" 0 are quite reasonable. How-
ever, the Court's reasoning ignores the possibility that legislation can be dramati-
cally affected during the appropriation process."' Also, the Supreme Court seems
to have concentrated on CEQ's interpretations (of NEPA § 102(2)(C)) to such an
9 d.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. at 356.
10 See supra note 63.
... Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. at 361.
102d. at 357.
103 43 Fed. Reg. 55978-56007 (1978). (40 C.F.R. § 1508.17 (1990) currently provides that "Legislation'
includes a bill or legislative proposal to Congress ... but does not include requests for appropriations.").
These regulations effectively reversed CEQ's prior interpretation of NEPA § 102(2)(C). CEQ had ruled that
the section applied to recommendations for legislation "including requests for appropriations." 40 C.F.R.
§ 1500.5(a)(1) (1977).
'" Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. at 359.
05 d. at 361.
', Id at 356. ([E]ither all appropriation requests constitute 'proposals for legislation,' or none does.").
'
071M. at 361-62.
lg d. at 362.
'09 Id. at 363.
"0 M. at 362.
"' Comment, supra note 6, 533, 558.
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extent that it ignored NEPA's legislative history, which often stressed the impor-
tance of preparing an EIS early in a particular decisionmaking process."1 Andrus
held thatNEPA did not require such early action. 3 If the EIS is to guide an agency's
actions, it needs to be available throughout the decisionmaking process.
No Substantive Requirements?
In the process of severely curtailing judicial supervision of agencies' choice
of procedure under the Administrative Procedure Act," 4 Justice Rehnquist"15 off-
handedly noted that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the
Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentiallyprocedural."" This seemingly
insignificant piece of dictum grew into a potential "NEPA-kiling monster" two
years later in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen."7
In Strycker's Bay, the Court reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit which had required significant consideration of NEPA."I The
Court disposed of the case in a terse, per curiam opinion.119 The opinion restated
Justice Rehnquist's dictum from Vermont Yankee 20 and effectively chastised the
Court of Appeals for ignoring that admonishment.12' To emphasize its point, the
majority stated, "[O]nce an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA's
procedural requirements, the only role for a court is to insure that the agency has
considered the environmental consequences .... ,"122 In so doing, the Court effec-
tively restated the "deference rule" of Chevron. 23 With regard to NEPA, reviewing
courts would henceforth be limited to determining whether an agency had consid-
ered the environmental consequences of its actions rather than whether the agency
112 1d. See also S. REp. No. 296, supra note 24, at 18.
13 See supra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
114 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1988).
At the time of the Vermont Yankee decision, Warren Burger was Chief Justice.
"' Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 435 U.S. 519, 558
(1978) (emphasis added).
"7 444 U.S. at 223 (1980). See also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
18 Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39 (2nd Cir. 1978). This was the case's second trip to the Second Circuit.
Originally, a group called the Trinity Episcopal School Corp. sued to enjoin the New York City Planning
Commission and the Dept. of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from following through with their
plans to construct low-income housing at a particular site. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 387
F. Supp. 1044 (S.D. N.Y. 1974). The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's judgment for
defendants in all respects except one. The Second Circuit remanded so that HUD could prepare a statement
of alternatives. Trinity Episcopal School Corp. v. Romney, 523 F.2d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 1975). The District
Court subsequently approved IIUD's analysis which concluded that any relocation of the disputed housing
units would result in an unacceptable delay. 445 F. Supp. 204, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). The plaintiffs again
appealed.
"9 The Court devoted four and one-half pages of its opinions to a recitation of the tortuous case history.
Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 223-27. The actual decision took less than one full page. Id. at 227-28.
'"
20 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
121 Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 227.
I id. (emphasis added).
"' See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 11
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had given the environmental consequences proper weight.'1'
The lone dissenter in Strycker's Bay was Justice Marshall. 25 He argued that
the majority had misused Vermont Yankee in supporting its opinion. 12 6 The"offend-
ing" passage 127 hadbeen intended merely as a"further observation of some relevance
to [that] case." 2 He stressed that Vermont Yankee had made clear that reviewing
courts should set aside administrative decisions for "substantial procedural or
substantive reasons as mandated by [NEPA]."'' 29 He was quite surprised to find that
the "hard look" doctrine of Kleppe v. Sierra Club30 had not survived Vermont
Yankee.' In fact, Justice Marshall refused to believe that it had not. 32
Despite the relatively unambiguous language which the Court used in
Strycker's Bay, two interpretations of the decision arose. 33 The earliest decisions
rendered after Strycker's Bay also showed the lower courts' uncertainty as to what
the Supreme Court had intended." However, the general trend seemed to be that
the courts would limit their review to whether an agency had considered environ-
mental factors under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 35 By ensuring that the
agency had considered environmental factors, these courts were, in a sense, using
substantive review; they simply were not reaching the merits (i.e., reviewing the
reasonableness of the agency's decision once the agency had shown that it had duly
considered environmental factors). 36 The effective result of this struggling over
"u In Strycker's Bay, the Court noted, "[T]he District Court expressly concluded that HUD had not acted
arbitrarily or capriciously and ... the Court of Appeals...did not overturn that finding. Instead, the [Court
of Appeals] required HUD to elevate environmental concerns over other, admittedly legitimate,
considerations... NEPA... [does not] support ... a reordering of priorities by a reviewing court."
Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 228 n. 2.
123 Id. at 228.
'26 Id. at 229.
'21 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
'" Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 229 (citing Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 557).
'29 Id. (citing Vermont Yankee, 435 U.S. at 558) (emphasis in original).
130 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (one of only three cases the Court cited in Strycker's Bay).
Strycker's Bay, 444 U.S. at 229.
132 Id. at 231. ("I cannot believe that the Court would adhere to [the suggestion that Vermont Yankee limits
a reviewing court to merely determining whether an agency had considered environmental factors even if
the agency had effectively ignored those factors in reaching its conclusion] in a different factual setting.").
W" Compare Goldsmith & Banks, Environmental Values: Institutional Responsibility and the Supreme
Court, 7 HARV. EN rI. L. R v. 1, 9-13 (1983) (review on the merits of NEPA now precluded); Comment,
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 10 E,~va. L. 643 (1980) (NEPA creates no substantive
duties for agencies) with Liebesman, The Council on Environmental Quality's Regulations to Implement the
National Environmental Policy Act-Will They Further NEPA's Substantive Mandate?, 10 Ewa. L. RaP.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 50, 039 (1980) (substantive mandate of NEPA § 101 survived Strycker's Bay).
'34 Compare Citizens for Mass Transit v. Adams, 630 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1980) (Strycker's Bay precluded
review of reasonableness of agency's decision); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C.
1980) (agency consideration of environmental effects satisfied by a sufficiently detailed EIS), rev'din part,
642 F.2d 589 (1980), with South Louisiana Envtl. Council, Inc. v. Sand, 629 F.2d 1005 (5th Cir. 1980)
(NEPA 101 still permitted reviewing courts to inquire whether an agency gave "sufficient weight" to
environmental factors).
135 Weinstein, supra note 57, at 852-53.
'm Id. at 853 (especially n. 110).
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how to review agency treatment of NEPA was that NEPA § 101 no longer would
have the effect of substantive law. 137
Three years later, the Supreme Court clarified some of these remaining
ambiguities in Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.t'8 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals had reversed a Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) decision on the merits due to a "violation" of
NEPA's requirements.'39 The Court of Appeals utilized the arbitrary and capricious
standard of review set forth in Strycker's Bay."4" The underlying rationale of the
appellate decision was that NEPA § 102 required agencies to consider all cost-
benefit factors in their decisionmaking processes.' 41 The Supreme Court rejected
this rationale 42 and held that NEPA did not require any particular process 143 even
though it did require consideration and disclosure of environmental costs.'" Rather
than stopping after this finding of "full consideration of environmental conse-
quences,''1 45 the Court then reviewed the reasonableness of the agency's decision.'"
Thus, the Court did "substantively review NRC's decisionmaking process".' 4'
Exactly why the Court did so is a matter of some debate.148 Nevertheless, the Court
did not review the merits of NRC's decision (i.e., the wisdom of not considering the
environmental effects of the spent nuclear fuel in making licensing decision). 149
Instead, it reviewed the "merits" of NRC's decisionmaking process.'i"
13 d. at 854.
13' 462 U.S. 87 (1983). Ironically, this case was the "lineal descendant" of Vermont Yankee. Vermont
Yankee was an appeal from a D.C. Circuit decision, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n., 547 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom. Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). On remand, the
Court of Appeals vacated the NRC's new rulemaking proceeding. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n., 685 F.2d 459 (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Court granted certiorari
and heard the defendants' appeal. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
462 U.S. 87 (1983).
. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United Stales Regulatory Comm'n., 685 F.2d 459, 482-86
(D.C. Cit. 1982).
40 d. at 475, 485.
M'I Weinstein, supra note 57, at 860.
,42 Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 104-07.
14 Id. at 100.144 Id. at 97-98.
145 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
'"Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 104-06.
"'7 See id. at 105. See also Weinstein, supra note 57, at 865.
'" Weinstein, supra note 57, at 865-73. Weinstein discusses three possible explanations for the Court's
actions. First, the Court might have found other "law to apply" in an NRC rule. d. at 865-66. Second, the
Court might have decided that NEPA contains enough substantive law to allow limited substantive review.
d. at 867-70. Third, the Court might have ignored Overton Park's "law to apply" rule (see Overton Park,
401 U.S. 410-17) and reviewed the agency's decision anyway. Id. at 870-73.
149 In this sense, this Comment disagrees with Weinstein's conclusion that the Court substantively reviewed
NRC's decision "on the merits." See, e.g., id. at 865. Although the distinction (see infra note 150 and
accompanying text) might seem like hair splitting, it makes a significant difference to a court reviewing the
environmental effects of an agency's decision. For more on the Court's post-Strycker's Bay treatment of
NEPA review, see Murchison, supra note 6 at 598-600.
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co., 462 U.S. at 104-06. 13
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The practical effect of this series of decisions has been to preclude future
judicial inquiry as extensive as that which occurred in Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the United States Army.' Although some observers
seem almost enthusiastic about a perceived limiting effect which Baltimore Gas &
Elec. Co. supposedly had on the holding of Strycker's Bay, others believe the
Court's restriction on judicial activism without a corresponding Congressional
expansion of the duty of agencies to consider the environmental consequences of
their decisions has left the cookie jar unguarded. 53 A reading of NEPA which
requires little more than a "consideration of environmental factors"'' does not
ensure that federal agencies "plan and work toward meeting the challenge of abetter
environment."'"s
TMm FOR A CHANGE
In an era where the federal government is willing to spend billions of dollars
to regulate the manner in which private industries affect the environment, the irony
of the government's diminishing willingness to police itself becomes apparent. As
Professor Murchison' has noted, "Because NEPA failed to change the institutional
pressures on federal agencies, it has not significantly affected the decisions those
agencies make."' 157 Because the Court has been unwilling to fill in the "substantive
gaps", or to allow the lower courts to do the same,' the American public is left with
a statute which merely requires agency bureaucrats to include environmental impact
statements with their final reports which show that the agency has somehow
"considered" the possible environmental consequences of its proposed action. 59
The only ones who benefit from this charade are "the consultants who prepare impact
statements forthe agencies and the law professors who ... have a seemingly endless
stream of environmentally objectionable decisions to criticize."' 60
Senator Muskie himself advocated one possible solution in 1973.161 In
response to calls for a more comprehensive national policy, he suggested increased
legislative output of "standards-setting" laws and strongerjudicial review.162 As the
" See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
5z See, e.g., Weistein, supra note 57, at 879-81.
See Murchison, supra note 6, at 601-02 (reviewing the early response of the Circuit Courts to Strycker's
Bay).
" The Supreme Court still recognizes the importance of a mandatory "hard look" by the agencies, but fails
to provide for judicial oversight of the same. See BAmL-rtoa GAs & Et.ac. Co., 462 U.S. at 100,
155 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
Murchison is a law professor at Louisiana State University. Murchison, supra note 6, at 557.
1 7 Id. at 603.
158 See, e.g., supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
' CEQ regulations call for EISs to "serve as the means of assessing the environmental impact of proposed
agency action, rather than justifying decision already made." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.2(g) (1990). Nobody can
be certain, however, how often the former is true rather than the latter.
160 Murchison, supra note 6, at 603 (paraphrasing Sax, supra note 76, at 248).
16 Muskie & Cutler, supra note 51.
'6 Id. at 165-66.
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"substantive statutes"'163 primarily affect an agency only after a particular decision
has been made but fail to affect the decision itself, they do not "compel... the
Executive agencies.., to take the kind of action which will protect [the environ-
ment]."le Experience has proven this suggestion to be less than effective. The
"substantive" statutes on the books such as the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water
Act have not prevented agencies from taking many environmentally questionable
actions.1 65
Another possible solution is the amendment of NEPA1 66 This could be done
in one of two ways: either add substantive provisions or toughen the existing
procedural requirements. Deciding which substantive provisions to add would be
a politically difficult task. Perhaps a more realistic approach would be to toughen
existing procedural requirements.
A possible first step in addressing this task could be an effective reversal of
the holding in Andrus v. Sierra Club.16 Having an EIS already completed at the time
for appropriation hearings would certainly aid in "assessing the environmental
impact of proposed agency actions rather thanjustifying decisions already made.' 6
Members of Congress, environmental groups, and the public would all be better
informed at a stage of the proceedings where remedial steps could still be taken. This
requirement would tend to promote interaction between the legislature and the
agencies and to encourage agency accountability so that America is left with a "better
environment' 69 rather than one in which the degradation thereof was "thoroughly
considered. 170
If Congress were willing to go so far as to thoroughly amend NEPA, it should
consider completely rewriting the Act. 71 The present Congress would have the
chance to put its stamp on environmental law and to make clear what substantive
duties, with respect to the environment, it desires federal agencies to fulfill while
accomplishing their individual missions." Much of the current statute could be
" This is Senator Muskie's alternate term for "standards-setting". See id. at 166, 170.
' Senate Hearings, supra note 19, at 116.
"6 See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Morton, 510 F.2d 813 (5th Cir. 1975) (Dept. of Interior allowed to proceed with
sale of off-shore tracts of Outer Continental Shelf despite research which was "either inadequate or
nonexistent in some areas"); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 289 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (agency
allowed to proceed as long as gaps in information "identified").
I" Ile amendment of environmental statutes is not unknown. For example, see the Clean Air Act. The 1970
Act, 42U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970), was recodified, 42U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1977), toincorporate the 1977
amendments.
167 See supra notes 95-108 and accompanying text.
16 See supra note 159.
6 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
170 See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
"' After all, the title of the act is the National Environmental Policy Act of1969. See supra note I (emphasis
added). Perhaps the time has come for a National Policy Act of 1992.
"7 This would seem to be preferable to forcing the courts to search for substantive duties in what is (in its
present condition) an unarguably vague statute.
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merely re-enacted.'1 3 Its "substantive mandate" (i.e., the directions concerning what
to do with the documents produced by meeting the procedural requirements),
however, is currently woefully lacking in "law to apply." At present, NEPA § 101
is indeed "nothing more than [lofty declarations].""" As a national policy, NEPA
as presently written is full of good intentions but practically devoid of ways to
implement those intentions.
CONCLUSION
On January 1, 1991, NEPA celebrated its twenty-first "birthday." For a law
which has reached the age of majority and which should be entering the prime of life,
NEPA instead seems to be a ninety-eight pound weakling in search of a reason to
live. Some have diligently searched for (and, to an extent, discovered) some
continuing effects of NEPA as it is currently interpreted. 75 However, NEPA
presently has only as much effect as that which agency bureaucrats choose to give
it.'76 Congress needs to check this essentially unfettered agency discretion by
rewriting NEPA to force agencies to make environmental consequences a major part
of their practicability calculus and to provide for some form of direct oversight of
the value given to the variables which go into that calculus.
DAVID G. BURLESON
1" For example, NEPA § 102 (the procedural requirements) have proven to be quite sufficient.
"4 See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
"See, e.g., Murchison, supra note 6, at 605-13.
, In other words, the amount of consideration given to environmental factors in the decisionmaking
processes is in control of those making the decisions.
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